Link na dva pisam u pdf formatu, via Mario Rizzo blog.

Sažetak pisama u WSJ.

Krugman sa svojim tipičnim opterećenim govorom i snažnim mišljenjima. (I odgovor otkrivača pisama.)

Naravno, ovaj level debate je skoro pa nepoznat i nepostojeći u hrvatskim medijima, pa čak i u Hrvatskom političkim, akademskim krugovima. Ako se negdje nešto slično i raspravlja, iza zatvorenih akademskih vrata, isto kao da se i ne raspravlja, jer javnost mora znati i čuti. Okvira nema, argumenta je malo, nabijene riječi bez značaja. Vladina ekonomska politika je reakcionarna. Ponekad mi se čini da je level ekonomskog dijaloga u Hrvatskoj na razini ovog stripa. Mislim da je Zvonimir Despot u pravu.

Posebice je kritično stanje za humanističke i društvene znanosti u Hrvatskoj. … U društvenim i humanističkim znanostima krajnje smo autistični i samodovoljni. Uostalom, zato nam i jest ovakvo društvo i društveno ozračje – i/ili zaostalo i antiintelektualno desno i/ili retrogradno i anacionalno lijevo.

Iako je cijeli post zanimljiv, previše je paušalnosti. Već u drugom paragrafu potpuno se pogrešno predstavlja nekakav Keynes-Smith konflikt tako da Smithu pripisuješ nekakve ideje koje nemaju veza sa njim. Adam Smith nema nikakve veze sa slobodnim tržištem, o tome nije pisao. Ljudi, među kojima i naši ekonomisti za ideološke potrebe, često uspoređuju nevidljivu ruku i slobodno tržište iako to nema veze jedno sa drugim niti je Smith tako razmišljao. Smith nema nikakve veze sa punom zaposlenošću ili nekakvom analizom agregatne potražnje – općenito ideja makroekonomije zaposlenosti Keynesa ili nekog modernog ekonomista je bila nepoznata Smithu. Adam Smith isto nema nikakve veze sa “laissez faire”. Za njega to nije bilo relevantno i nije se držao te politike, tako da stavljanje “čuvene Smithove” ispred je pogrešno. Nema veze sa njim. Cijeli taj dio je brkanje naranča i banana.
Pošto je FDR umro 1945. uzeti ću kao “mali” tipo da je *on* osnovao Council of Econ. Advisers 1946. (CEA je osnovan ’46.)
Usporedno sa trabunjanjem oko Smitha, dijelovi oko Keynesa su bolji i korektniji. Mnogi koji ne znaju zašto su Hayek i pogotovo Friedman dobili nobelove će možda pitati. Koji znaju neće jer znaju da nema veze sa pojednostavljenim, paušalnim ideologijama koje se često prezentiraju po medijima. Asocijacije na Chicago boys, USSR i neke druge zemlje su i više nego slobodno interpretiranje povijesti. Ali dobro. Ne, nije došlo do potpunog zaborava Keynesa. Keynesova ekonomija nikada nije izgubila na relevantnosti koliko je izgubila utjecaja koji se sada vraća zbog situacije u svijetu. A izgubila je utjecaja zbog njenog iskorištavanja za neke pseudo-socijalističke svrhe i maltretiranja preko onoga za što je namjenjena. Keynesova teorija ima i neke greške koje su se pokušale ispraviti. Mehanizmi kojima država može/mora utjecati na ekonomiju su namjenjeni njenoj stabilizaciji u posebnim slučajevima – poput u slučaju Velike Depresije i pogotovo kad je monetarna politika izgubila utjecaj na potražnju – kao što je to danas u nekim zemljama. Plan G onda stupa na scenu. Svako širenje opsega tih državnih/fiskalnih mehanizama na nekakav razvoj i državnu intervenciju i mješanje u ekonomsku aktivnost u svako doba je natezanje i donjeti će više štete nego koristi.

Jedina zamjerka Bernankeu ovdje je korištenje presnažne riječi pohlepe kod opisa Smitha, što će zlodusi ili jednostavno neupućena javnost izvrnuti u dogmatska i moralna zveketanja. Adam Smith nije nikada pobrkao zalaganje za osobni interes i sebičnost, pohlepu i tome slično.

“Namjera mi je bila olakšati sebi poreznu situaciju. Ništa više.”

Iako izjava zvući kao biser, nije besmislena. U maniri vrsnog intelektualca, Banac se bavio jedinim zanimanjem  koje donosi nagradu. Možda i J. M. Keynes ima biser godine.

“The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that carries any reward.” – John Maynard Keynes

Ovo mi je najbolja naslovnica od svih povijesnih danas. Više njih iz cijelog svijeta možete vidjeti ovdje.

Svi mediji citiraju prvih par redaka Obaminog pobjedničkog govora. No, ovaj dio je posebno odskočio u mojoj glavi.

And to all those who have wondered if America’s beacon still burns as bright – tonight we proved once more that the true strength of our nation comes not from our the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity, and unyielding hope.

Tokom govora, mislio sam da je rekao ideas, da bi poslje čitajući govor vidio da je zapravo rekao ideals. Razlika je, ali zanemarimo semantiku i dodajmo da bi došli do ideala trebaju nam ideje. Evo što je netko vrlo utjecajan imao za reći o idejama jednom davno.

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.

Meni ne smeta da svjetom vladaju američki ideali i ideje. Jedan od američkih ideala je da u Americi pripadate idejama i idealima.

The looming bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the forced sale of Merrill Lynch, two of the greatest names in finance, marks the end of an era. But what’s next?

Cycles of economic fashion are as old as business cycles, and are usually caused by deep business disturbances. “Liberal” cycles are followed by “conservative” cycles, which give way to new liberal ones, and so on. Liberal cycles are characterized by government intervention and conservative cycles by government retreat. A long liberal cycle stretched from the 1930s to the 1970s, followed by a cycle of deregulation that seems to have run its course.

With the nationalization of American mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the February nationalization of Britain’s Northern Rock, governments are stepping in again. The heady days of conservative economics are over for now.

Each cycle is triggered by crisis. The last liberal cycle, associated with the New Deal and economist John Maynard Keynes, was triggered by the Great Depression, although it took massive wartime government spending to get it properly going. During this era, governments in the capitalist world managed and regulated their economies to maintain full employment and moderate business fluctuations. The new conservative cycle was triggered by 1970s inflation. Milton Friedman, the economic guru of that era, asserted that the deliberate pursuit of full employment was bound to fuel inflation. Governments should concentrate on keeping money “sound” and leave the economy to look after itself. The “new classical economics” taught that, in the absence of egregious government interference, economies would gravitate naturally to full employment, greater innovation and higher growth rates.

The current crisis reflects the massive buildup of bad debt that became apparent with the subprime crisis, which has now spread to the whole credit market. “Think of an inverted pyramid,” investment banker Charles Morris has written. “The more claims are piled on top of real output, the more wobbly the pyramid becomes.”

When the pyramid starts crumbling, taxpayers must step in to refinance the banking system, revive mortgage markets and prevent economic collapse. But once government intervenes on this scale, it usually stays for a long time.

At issue is the oldest unresolved dilemma in economics: Are market economies “naturally” stable or do they need to be stabilized by policy? Keynes emphasized the flimsiness of the expectations on which economic activity in decentralized markets is based. The future is inherently uncertain; investor psychology is fickle.

“The practice of calmness, of immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down,” Keynes wrote. “New fears and hopes will, without warning, take charge of human conduct.” This is the “herd behaviour” that George Soros has identified as the dominant feature of financial markets. It is the government’s job to stabilize expectations.

The neo-classical revolution held that markets were much more cyclically stable than Keynes believed, that the risks in all market transactions can be known in advance, that prices will therefore always reflect objective probabilities.

Such market optimism led to deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s, and the subsequent explosion of financial innovation that made it “safe” to borrow larger and larger sums on the back of predictably rising assets. The just-collapsed credit bubble, fuelled by so-called special investment vehicles, derivatives, collateralized debt obligations and phony triple-A ratings, was built on the illusions of mathematical modelling.

Liberal cycles, historian Arthur Schlesinger believed, succumb to the corruption of power, conservative cycles to the corruption of money.

Both have their characteristic benefits and costs. But if we look at the historical record, the liberal regime of the 1950s and 1960s was more successful than the conservative regime that followed. Except for China and India, whose economic potential was unleashed by market economics, economic growth was faster and much more stable in the Keynesian golden age than in the age of Friedman; its fruits were more equitably distributed; social cohesion and moral habits better maintained. These are serious benefits to weigh against some business sluggishness.

Of course, history never repeats itself exactly. Circuit-breakers are in place nowadays to prevent a 1929-style slide. But when the system seizes up as it has now, we are clearly in for a new round of regulation.

The cycles in economic fashion show how far economics is from being a science. One cannot think of any natural science in which orthodoxy swings between two poles. What gives economics the appearance of a science is that its propositions can be expressed mathematically by abstracting from the real world.

The classical economics of the 1920s abstracted from the problem of unemployment by assuming that it did not exist. Keynesian economics, in turn, abstracted from the problem of official incompetence and corruption by assuming that governments were run by omniscient, benevolent experts. Today’s “new classical economics” abstracted from the problem of uncertainty by assuming it could be reduced to measurable, hedgeable risk.

A few geniuses aside, economists frame their assumptions to suit existing states of affairs, then invest them with an aura of permanent truth. They are intellectual butlers, serving the interests of those in power, not vigilant observers of shifting reality. Their systems trap them in orthodoxy.

When events coincide with their theorems, the orthodoxy they espouse enjoys its moment of glory. When events shift, it becomes obsolete. As Charles Morris wrote: “Intellectuals are reliable lagging indicators, near-infallible guides to what used to be true.”

Lord Skidelsky is professor emeritus of political economy at Warwick University, England, and author of a prize-winning Keynes biography.