Moram i ja kao i digresije.info bloger prije više od mjesec dana pitati šta je sad pak ovo? Poanta performansa mi izmiče. Poruka bar koda mi je nejasna. Da li je to na nekom apstraktom levelu koji ja ne mogu dohvatiti ili čisto bedasto?

Studenti Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu održali su prosvjedni performans na Trgu bana Jelačića pod sloganom „Kupujmo hrvatske studente!“.

Studenti su na čelo nacrtali ‘bar kod’ čime su poručili još jednom da ‘znanje nije roba’, te su legli na trg i ‘prodavali’ se po cijeni 10.000kn

Osim što još jednom pokazivanja nesposobnosti agumentiranja, poruka je opet ista; znanje nije roba i ne žele ga izmjenjivati/trgovati za novac. Ok, to smo shvatili. Naravno, to podrazumjeva da osim što ga ne žele kupovati, ne žele ga ni prodavati. Dakle neće i ne žele prodavati poslodavcima (“za novac”) svoje znanje i specijalizirane vještine koje su stjecali i razradili tokom studija. Da li to znači rad bez plaće ili , vjerojatnije, bez premije iznad zakonskog minimalca? To valjda podrazumijeva i samozaposlenost? Razumijemo poruku, ali način na koji je ona prenešena je promašen. Loš marketing.

Podsjeća me na epizodu Seinfelda “Junk Mail” u kojoj Kramer protestira protiv poštanske usluge. Osim djelenja letaka o “zlu pošte” imao je i lutku u uniformi poštara sa vedrom preko glave. “Zašto poštar ima vedro na glavi?” pita George. “Ha? Pa jer simbolizira naše gonjenje” odgovori Kramer. “Onda … ne bi li ti trebao nositi vedro?” kaže George. Poruka je vidljiva i razumljiva, ali je očajno, nekonstruktivno i tragikomično prenesena.

Dakle, što ovaj bar kod i cijene od 10 000 kuna predstavlja?  Proizvod i njegovu cijenu? Ali nitko ‘studenta’ kao tijelo ne želi. Tijelo košta mnogo za održavati na životu. Možda zvuči grubo, ali tijelo kao tako baš se i ne cijeni i traži. Njegove sposobnosti i viještine, motoričke, a posebice umne, se cijene i traže. Ne zanima nas tijelo, već ono što ono donosi sa sobom: vještine, ideje, poduhvate, odvažnost za rizik, smjelost … znanje. No studenti nekako (zbog krivih dojmova?) misle obrnuto, pa su izgleda “odlučili” prodati tijelo za 10 000 kuna, umjesto prodavati um, znanje i viještine za 10 000 kuna na mjesec.

Da li je itko od tih studenata razmislio o tome što rade i što žele signalizirati? Žalosno je jer se radi o tobože bistrim studentima, a sve je zbrda zdola.

Ms. Merkel said she couldn’t see the need for a broad grant of aid to Eastern Europe. “The situation is very different” in Europe’s economies. “We cannot compare Slovakia nor Slovenia with Hungary,” she told reporters.

…

But both the bailout and calls for Eastern European countries to join the euro sooner were coolly received by Western European nations. Ms. Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy both separately suggested that Eastern countries should look elsewhere — to the International Monetary Fund, for instance — for help.

Behind the tensions: The recession has struck the 27 EU nations with widely varying force. Large and steady economies such as Germany’s are facing an inevitable slowdown, but smaller peripheral states such as Latvia, Bulgaria and even Ireland have been brutally whipsawed from an era of heady growth to shockingly fast decline.

The impact on Eastern Europe, which boomed in recent years, has been especially intense. Latvia, which financed its own expansion by borrowing from abroad, is literally running out of money as the credit crunch shuts those spigots off. Last week, Standard & Poor’s cut Latvia’s credit rating to junk.

And, as some in Eastern Europe warned, deep pain could well emerge elsewhere. All eyes are on Ireland, which is slashing public-sector pay as it scrambles to close a budget deficit that could reach nearly 10% of gross-domestic product. A protest last month in Dublin drew more than 100,000 people. …

The EU’s disinclination to fund a regional bailout suggests that the IMF and other multilateral institutions will take on an even larger role in coming months — a role that IMF officials have said they recognize. The IMF is looking to double its war chest for lending to $500 billion, and the EU is weighing whether or not to make a loan for that purpose. Last week, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank said they would provide €24.5 billion in financing for banks in Eastern Europe.

The IMF has been active on Europe’s periphery: Iceland, Hungary, Latvia and Ukraine have turned to the agency for aid.

Most critical was the cold shoulder from Germany, which, as Europe’s largest economy and the one with most access to borrowing, would play the largest role in financing any aid. Germany, the EU’s strongest economy, is unwilling to unwind its own fiscal discipline to pay for the spending excesses of others. Admitting countries with weaker finances could hurt the strength of the euro or push up inflation across the euro zone.

…Ukrajina puca…

Steel and chemical factories, once the muscle of Ukraine’s economy, are dismissing thousands of workers. Cities have had days without heat or water because they cannot pay their bills, and Kiev’s subway service is being threatened. Lines are sprouting at banks, the currency is wilting and even a government default seems possible.

Ukraine, once considered a worldwide symbol of an emerging, free-market democracy that had cast off authoritarianism, is teetering. And its predicament poses a real threat for other European economies and former Soviet republics. …

It is not hard to understand why world leaders are increasingly worried about the discontent and the financial crisis in Ukraine, which has 46 million people and a highly strategic location. A small country like Latvia or Iceland is one thing, but a collapse in Ukraine could wreck what little investor confidence is left in Eastern Europe, whose formerly robust economies are being badly strained. …

While Ukraine’s economy is dependent on exports of steel and chemicals, which have plummeted, the crisis has cut deeply because people are disillusioned with the government. …

In February, the International Monetary Fund refused to release the next installment of a $16.4 billion rescue loan to Ukraine because the government would not adhere to an earlier agreement to pare its budget. On Friday, the monetary fund projected that Ukraine’s economy would shrink by 6 percent this year, and said that it was continuing to work with the government to find a way to disburse the rest of the rescue loan.

…Korejancima opako pada izvoz, pa režu plaće.

Shinchang Electrics Co. offered union leaders a proposal that would reduce wages at the auto-parts company by 20% in exchange for no layoffs among its 810 workers this year. Eight days later, the union agreed.

The deal is one sign of the unusual way South Korea is grappling with the global economic crisis. Across the country, executives, salaried employees and hourly workers at companies from banks to shipbuilders are joining to slash wages and other costs with the goal of avoiding layoffs….

In South Korea, job preservation is the government’s biggest goal in shaping its response to the onset of recession, President Lee Myung-bak declared in January. Last week, leaders of major industry groups, unions, civic groups and government ministries struck a “grand bargain for social unity.” Under the plan, which isn’t legally binding, employers won’t fire workers, unions will accept wage freezes or cuts, and the government will provide tax breaks to companies that preserve jobs….

Some other countries and companies are also attempting to stave off massive job cuts by asking workers to scale back hours, take pay cuts or schedule time off without pay. Last week, Ford Motor Co. Chairman Bill Ford and Chief Executive Alan Mulally agreed to take 30% cuts in salary for two years to help win union support for capping wages. In Canada, a United Steelworkers union of nearly 600 salaried employees agreed in January to a four-day work week to avoid layoffs.

However, no place seems to be making such a coordinated national push as South Korea. It’s too soon to tell precisely what the country’s no-layoff drive will produce, whether a viable means to cope with recession or a mere delay of painful job cuts….

The current economic crisis hit South Korea later than other countries because its banks had little exposure to distressed property investments in the U.S. But South Korea was slapped hard when the banking crisis turned into an economic one, leading to job losses and lower consumer spending in the U.S. and Europe.

Demand for the electronics, steel, cars and other products South Korea sells to those places fell sharply, sending its fourth-quarter gross domestic product down at an annualized rate of 21%, the biggest drop of any developed country — and more than three times the U.S. rate of 6.2%.

South Korea didn’t face a drop in exports during its two previous recessions, which meant it could recover relatively quickly. Today, exports account for about two-thirds of South Korea’s near-$1 trillion GDP, up from about one-third in 1998. And the shock of a rapid drop in shipments — down 17% in February from the previous February after a decline of 32.8% in January — is rippling through the country’s manufacturing base. The country’s weakened currency has provided some cushion to corporate profits, since it means that money earned abroad is worth more when converted to the Korean won.

An entrenched cultural force is also at the heart of the push to avoid layoffs at all costs. Like many Asian societies, South Korea’s is more communal than individualistic. The loss of a job can be deeply humiliating and also mean the loss of a kind of second home. All but the smallest employers offer benefits such as education and weekend getaways….

Sharing the Cuts

In the 1998 recession, Shinchang and its union agreed to a similar pay cut. A year later, as the country started to recover, the company boosted pay for workers above their pre-recession salaries by 20% for the next two years before returning to its normal wage agreement.

Nothing in the latest agreement specifies that Shinchang will boost wages above current levels after the economy recovers, but Park Jong-nam, the company’s personnel manager, says it is likely. And Mr. Shim, who molds ignition components, says, “They didn’t say they would reward this, but we trust them.”

In January, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the second-largest umbrella group of unions, and the Korean Employers Federation, a group representing midsize companies, proposed the building of a national consensus on layoffs and wage cuts. A series of meetings followed that produced the broad agreement last week.

“We find it’s getting more serious than the [1997-98] period,” said Kang Choong-ho, a spokesman for the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. “This time we thought we must keep jobs and yield what we can, sharing the pain.”

But the endgame in South Korea may turn out to be more painful. At a news conference early last month, LG Electronics Co. CEO Nam Yong said he’s watching the cost savings that the firm’s Japanese rivals are achieving by cutting jobs, and he will try to match them. “There are no reasons to lay off staff for now,” Mr. Nam said. Down the line, he added, “It’s difficult to give a clear answer.”

(Naravno, mi nismo Koreja.)

Undergrad Economics Sees Popularity Surge

“…stasah pod palicom vrlo uglednih ekonomista, znanstvenika europskog i svjetskog glasa upravo ovdje na Ekonomskom fakultetu u Zagrebu. Radih i još uvijek radim s kolegama iz velikih europskih kompanija i budite sigurni da mi ni u jednom trenu nije nedostajalo stručnih znanja ili da se nađoh u situaciji nepoznavanja materije.”

Pošteno. Mnogo odličnih ekonomista, bankara i sposobnih managera-poduzetnika jest stasalo na EFZG. A onda kad odete na jedan od hrvatskih ili stranih (pogotovo stranih) informativnih servisa i pročitate ovo….

Akcija Indeks: 23 optužena zbog korupcije na Ekonomskom fakultetu

USKOK je pred Županijskim sudom u Zagrebu, u slučaju Indeks podignuo optužnicu protiv 23 hrvatskih državljanina. Tereti ih se za više kaznenih djela udruživanja za počinjenje kaznenih djela, davanja i primanja mita, protuzakonitog posredovanja i poticanja na protuzakonito posredovanje, zloporabe položaja i ovlasti.

Nakon provedene istrage tijekom koje su donesene četiri presude u istrazi, optuženo je devet profesora, uključujući i bivšu predsjednicu saborskog Povjerenstva za odlučivanje o sukobu interesa Dešu Mlikotin Tomić, vanjski suradnik, asistent, voditeljica referade, trojica posrednika i osmero studenata s Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu.

… shvatite da to nije baš najbolje za ugled fakulteta, svoj zaposlenika i diplomaca. Da li je i drill u korupciji dio hrvatskog okoliša?

Znam, “ušminkani” blog je kriv. Citat dana i jedan od meni omiljenih citata:

I always cheer up immensely if an attack is particularly wounding because I think, well, if they attack one personally, it means they have not a single political argument left.

Margaret Thatcher

Oni bi trebali Hrvatsku spasiti od krize

Vlada i Gospodarsko-socijalno vijeće u poslu oko prevladavanja krize odlučili su osloniti se i na tim istaknutih ekonomista koji bi, kako Vladi tako i realnom sektoru, trebali pomoći u predlaganju mjera

Vladin prijedlog za zamrzavanjem plaća u ponedjeljak su na višesatnom sastanku sindikalni predstavnici odbili, a poslodavci zatražili dodatne mjere pomoći. Premijer Ivo Sanader inicirao je osnivanje savjetodavnog odbora kojemu cilj nije biti tek premosnica za lakše postizanje konsenzusa socijalnih partnera oko proračuna, već bi i nakon toga trebao pomoći u iznalaženju rješenja za prevladavanje krize.

S tim u vezi Sanader je već izbacio i neka imena ekonomista na koje se računa, ističući kako su neki od njih već na to i pristali. Među imenima u opticaju su Sandra Švaljek i Željko Lovrinčević s Ekonomskog instituta, glavni ekonomski savjetnik guvernera HNB-a Žarko Miljenović, glavni ekonomist Raiffeisen banke Anton Starčević, nekadašnji guverner Ante Čičin-Šain, zatim ekonomski strateg SDP-a Ljubo Jurčić koji se u toj ulozi pojavljuje kao predsjednik Hrvatskog društva ekonomista, privatni konzultant Mladen Vedriš, a navodno bi i sindikati i HGK trebali imati svog predstavnika u odboru. No, dok neki kažu kako su upoznati s inicijativom, neki još ne znaju da su dio nje. Čičin-Šain tako kaže tek da su vremena takva da da je odaziv pitanje društvene odgovornosti, a među imenima je prepoznao i neka s kojima rado surađuje i koje cijeni. Miljenović o svom ‘angažmanu’ u odboru zasad nije (bio) upoznat, a smatra i da bi takva tijela trebala podrazumijevati sličan pogled na ekonomiju jer u protivnom teško mogu biti efikasna. Većina s liste smatra kako je konsenzus oko štednje potreban (s jedne strane kroz privremeno zamrzavanje plaća a s druge kroz prolongiranje velikih infrastrukturnih projekata).

Ukratko, zbog savjetnika kojima se Obama okružio i zbog toga što je proveo 12 godina kao predvač prava na UofC, Obamanomics će biti temeljena (i već je u svojim prijedlozima) na Chicago School of Economics. Pažnja ovdje. Većina će to odmah asocirati sa Miltonom Friedmanom, što je donekle točno. Ali samo donekle. Chicago School ima dvije karakteristike – pozicija o ekonomskoj politici i metoda studiranja i istraživanja ekonomije. Chicago Škola je u javnosti najviše asocirana i prepoznata po prvom zbog djelovanja i veličine Miltona Friedmana kao glavnog arhitekta. Uz njega, mnogi drugi, među njima mnogi Nobelovci, su pridonjeli drugom aspektu Chicago Škole – rigoroznom empirijskom istraživanju i zaključivanju ekonomske problematike. Friedman je primjerice je pridonio rigoroznim izlaganjem teorije cijena kao alatu za razumjevanje ekonomske problematike. Kako prof. Thaler u članku ispod koji sam prenio is WSJ kaže – “podaci vladaju.” To je puno važniji aspekt Chicago Škole, i manje poznat, te upravo njemu pripada Barack Obama. Kao mnogi Demokrati na UofC, Obama smatra da je Friedman bio u pravu u mnogočemu, ali ne u svemu. Svakako rigorozno empirijsko istraživanje na kojem će počivati ekonomska politika je dio tog uvjerenja. Više detalja i podataka, a manje ideološkog usmjerenja.

Evo što je Nobelovac James Heckman rekao o radu na Obaminom ekonomskom timu.

“I’ve never worked with a campaign that was more interested in what the research shows.”

Ispod je kratki članak iz WSJ o Obaminoj asocijaciji sa Chicago Školom, a obavezno za pročitati je članak u NYT izašao ovog ljeta Obamanomics.

“The Chicago School of Economics” has become shorthand for a no-holds barred free-markets view of the world that borders on the libertarian. At the University of Chicago, Milton Friedman laid the intellectual foundations for the anti-inflation, tax-cutting, small-government policies of President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

So in some ways it’s strange that President-elect Barack Obama has been bouncing ideas off Chicago economists and counts some of them as his closest advisers.

It’s a sign of how the world has changed, with many ideas championed by Chicago economists finding greater acceptance. It’s also a sign of how Chicago has changed — though many economists at the university hold that the “Chicago School” was never quite what outsiders deemed it to be.

“The outside perception of Chicago economists is that they all believe whatever Milton Friedman believed in 1950,” said Richard Thaler, an economist at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and an adviser to Mr. Obama. “The correct perception here is: Data rules.”

Mr. Thaler is at the forefront of behavioral economics, which holds that markets are imperfect because people often stray from rational decisions. Mr. Thaler’s association with the Obama campaign led some to suggest that the president-elect’s economic policy will have a behaviorist bent. But behavioral economics is an outgrowth of a general shift over the years toward more data-based, empirical economics. That empirical shift grew from the advanced computing power and access to data ushered in by the information revolution. Many questions that economists debated on theoretical grounds have been settled by facts.

One reason for the alliance among economists at Chicago and elsewhere with Mr. Obama is that they feel he is a fellow traveler, sharing their empirical, data-driven bent. James Heckman, a University of Chicago Nobel laureate, looked over the Obama campaign’s education plan at the request of Austan Goolsbee, a Chicago business-school economist who is expected to head the White House Council of Economic Advisers.

“They were extremely interested in facts,” Mr. Heckman said. “There seemed to be, with the people I dealt with, less of an ideological bias and more of an empirical one. A lot of economists like to feel that the direction of the profession is going that way, too.”

Many economists were cheered in April when, amid higher gasoline prices, Mr. Obama opposed a gas-tax holiday — an idea supported by Sens. John McCain and Hillary Clinton, who was competing with Sen. Obama for the Democratic nomination. Textbook economics said in response to the tax cut, demand would simply raise gas prices to their previous level, and so the benefit of the cut would flow to energy producers rather than consumers.

“The gas-tax episode was a very good sign,” said Princeton University economist Jose Scheinkman, who spent most of his career at Chicago and was chairman of its economics department from 1995 to 1998.

Mr. Scheinkman, an Obama supporter, says that insofar as economics has changed, so has politics. “There are many things that used to be very common to the left that the left is no longer interested in,” he said. “They moved closer to the way economists tend to think.”

Still, a number of Mr. Obama’s pronouncements have made many economists wince. His sometimes strident views on trade protection during the campaign weren’t only troubling to Chicago’s free-trade backers. A 2005 survey of Ph.D.s randomly selected from the American Economics Association found that 87.5% of economists agreed that the U.S. should eliminate tariffs and barriers to trade.

In March, when a Canadian government memo surfaced citing Mr. Goolsbee saying that Obama campaign statements on the North American Free Trade Agreement amounted to “political positioning,” Mr. Obama took some lumps, but many economists were relieved.

Write to Justin Lahart at justin.lahart@wsj.com

Ovo mi je najbolja naslovnica od svih povijesnih danas. Više njih iz cijelog svijeta možete vidjeti ovdje.

Svi mediji citiraju prvih par redaka Obaminog pobjedničkog govora. No, ovaj dio je posebno odskočio u mojoj glavi.

And to all those who have wondered if America’s beacon still burns as bright – tonight we proved once more that the true strength of our nation comes not from our the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity, and unyielding hope.

Tokom govora, mislio sam da je rekao ideas, da bi poslje čitajući govor vidio da je zapravo rekao ideals. Razlika je, ali zanemarimo semantiku i dodajmo da bi došli do ideala trebaju nam ideje. Evo što je netko vrlo utjecajan imao za reći o idejama jednom davno.

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.

Meni ne smeta da svjetom vladaju američki ideali i ideje. Jedan od američkih ideala je da u Americi pripadate idejama i idealima.

I u ove kasne sate pretpostavljam da ima blogera/surfera koji prate završne sate THE izbora. Prvi exti poll – NBC izvještava da je za 63% glasača najvažnija tema ekonomija. Ne iznenađuje. Ipak, povijesno exit polls su bili oko 7% off od krajnjih rezultata. Tako, u slučaju da odete u krevet bez da znate tko je pobjedio, sutra ujutro pobjeda McCaina vas ne bi trebala iznenaditi. Ovo je što tržište kaže. Dobra članak sa još grafova ovdje. Klik na sliku u sredini za link na InTrade.

Tržište predviđa 92.9% šansu da Obama postane novi Predsjednik.

Samo 7.7% šansa da će McCain postati Predsjednik.

Domaći mediji, čak i oni poslovne i financijske prirode, uglavnom izvještavaju o svakodnevnom kretanju najvećih svjetskih burzovnih indeksa i naravno onog domaćeg. Crveni, padajući indeksi su jasni indikator financijske krize koja još uvijek traje. Crni, bombastični naslovi o strmoglavom padu burzi i dionica financijskih institucija su indikatori, prema medijima, da se krizi (panici) ne vidi kraj te da spasilački pothvati ne daju željene razultate. Prema tome, u obrnutom slučaju, nagli porast burzovnih indeksa i pogotovo financijskih institucija bili bi indikator završetka krize, ili barem početak kraja i postupnog ulaženja u period smirenih duhova.

Ipak, za bolje razumjevanje financijske krize (ili tkz. credit cruncha) potrebno nam je par konkretnijih pokazatelja, tj. oni koji nam govore što se zbiva na tržištu novca i kredita, a da su u isto vrijeme pristupačni i razumljivi ne-stručnoj javnosti. Gledanje u dioničke indekse kao pokazatelje oporavka ili završetka krize (što je vanjski događaj) je slabo jer je kratkoročnog pogleda; ne daju odgovor o oporavku u financijskom/bankarskom sektoru jer faktora koji utječu na promjene cijena dionice ima pravo mnoštvo, od razumljivih i izračunljivih (tehnički i fundamentalni) do Keynesovih “životinjskih duhova” i nikada nisu svi savršeno usklađeni. Promjene cijena dionica se kreću nasumce – Random Walk i tako nam ne služe kao prognoza završetka krize. Vijest o tome kako je burza zatvorila na dnevnoj bazi zvuči kao vijest, ali nije. Takvo praćenje burzi daje osjećaj informiranost o tome što se događa, a u biti uopće ne daje puno informacija. Dionice će uvijek dotaknuti dno prije nego ekonomija izađe iz recesije pa ne treba paničariti na dnevnoj bazi. Mediji samo rade senzaciju. To je zato jer dioničko tržište gleda unaprijed. Ono je palo u očekivanju slabe ekonomske aktivnosti, i s vremenom ono će se oporaviti kad očekuje poboljšanje i povratak zdravih profita. S vremenom i trendom, što nam dioničko tržište govori je da oporavak dolazi. Pametni će biti nagrađeni, a Buffet je pametan.

Kvalitetniji indikatori popravka trenutne krize su na kreditnim tržištima. Korak prema tome će biti i današnji sastanak FEDa i rezanje fed fund rate. Čak se očekuju i rezanje za 75 baznih bodova.

Oni koji prate strane medije (a nisu primjerice financijski/ekonomski stručnjaci sa stažom) i/ili fin/ekon blogosferu, sigurno su već naišli na materijale o raznim indikatorima kreditne krize i tržišta novca koji pokazuju razinu stres u financijskom sistemu. (Za njih ovdje nema ničeg posebno novog.) Primjerice, Economist je prije dva tjedna imao priču o smrznutom tržištu novca, da bi prekjučer pisao o postupnom poboljšanju i otapanju tržišta kredita.

Nakon propasti Lehmana tržište dionica je krenulo tankirati, a političari sa svojim ‘bailoutima’. No burze nisu gdje je akcija i njihova reakcija na mjere spašavanja je manje važna. Da li je odluka da Lehman propadne bila kvalitetna, još će se debatirati. Ali, kao što je glavni ekonomist MMFa Blanchard rekao, nije isključeno da neki drugi događaj za koji dan ne bi stvorio istu situaciju. U svakom slučaju, drži se da je propast Lehman Brothersa, tj. odbijanje Ministra Paulsona da upotrijebi porezni novac za spas, bio definitivni događaj koji je bacio kreditna tržišta u vrtlog straha i panike. To se sada pokušava spasiti, tj. vratiti u normalu.

Priča počinje sa primarnim indikatorom na međubankarnom novčanom tržištu, i mnogo puta spomenutom, Libor stopom. Ja sam o Libor referentnoj kamatnoj stopi jednom davno pisao, iako se onda radilo o Liboru na švicarske franke. Libor koji je ovdje bitan je onaj na kratkoročne dolarske zajmove među bankama jer  ima utjecaj na oko US$360 bilijuna vrijednosti financijske imovine u svijetu. Economist naziva Libor stopu “srčanim monitorom financijskog tržišta” jer predstavlja stopu/cijenu koju banke naplaćuju jedna drugoj za posuđivanja dolara primjerice na 3 mjeseca (a može biti i prekonoćni kredit) i kao referentna stopa za mnoge financijske instrumente (kreditne kartice, auti zajmove, hipoteke) ili pak  Merger&Acqustion aktivnosti. Izražena je u prosječnoj ponuđenoj kamatnoj stopi (od strane 16 banaka) za određeno razdoblje na Londonskom međubankarskom tržištu – npr. 3 month $ Libor.

3mjesečni Libor znači predstavlja cijenu koju banke naplaćuju jedna drugoj za posuđivanje novca na tri mjeseca. (Zanemariti ćemo sada ne baš ispravno nazivanje kamate cijenom novca.) Prekonoćna $Libor stopa (manji graf desno) bi trebala biti u liniji sa referentnom kamatom Fed-a (fed fund rate), a uvijek je koji postotak iznad jer je zapravo kamatna stopa formirana na slobodnom tržištu. No, u posljednje vrijeme, možemo čak reći u posljednjih godinu dana, Libor je bio daleko iznad Fed-ove kamatne stope više puta.(graf ispod)

Dok su najveće centralne banke svijeta snažno rezale svoje referentne stope, čak kooridnirano prije koji tjedan, međubankarske kamate su rasle. Razlog tome je da banke sjede na gotovini ne želeći je posuditi, što čini likvidnost oskudnom, vrijednom i tako skupom. Dok god je bankarski sistem zdrav (banke su u solidnom stanju) banke su voljne posuđivati jedna drugoj bez straha o povratku novca. Ali, tri mjeseca je dugo razdoblje za posuđivati novac drugim bankama u ovim vremenima kad se ne zna koja bi mogla biti sljedeća u liniji za bankort. Tako, banke sjede na gotovini, ne želeći je posuđivati (cash hoarding) i novčana tržišta se začepe, jednostavno prestanu funkcionirati. Sada prolazimo kroz vrijeme da je banke strah posuđivati jedna drugoj i to gura čitav financijski sistem na koljena.

Graf niže prikazuje najsvježije podatke za 3 mjesečni $Libor, sa pogledom na posljednjih šest mjeseci. Stopa je pala sa “krvavih” visina blizu 5%, no 3.5% je svakako još uvijek neprijazno i nepoželjno. Dnevni pomaci su manje bitni od ukupnog trenda (slično kao i sa tržištem kapitala) no svaki dan, prekonoćnu $Libor stopu možete vidjeti ovdje. A 3 mjesečni $Libor ovdje. Cilj je prilično jasan – niže je bolje. Nedavni padovi daju indikaciju na bolja vremena. Na krilima boljih uvjeta na tržištima kredita poletjela je jučer američka burza, unatoč lošem raspoloženju potrošača. (A što ako banke svakodnevno ne objave Libor iskreno? Znači li to da je realno još i viši i time je situacija još gora?)

Drugi indikator je prinos na tromjesečnu američku obveznicu – 3month T-bill. On je posebno koristan jer predstavlja tržišnu stopu kojoj trgovci na novčanom tržištu posebno vjeruju jer predstavlja stav “put your money where your mouth is.” Američka obveznica predstavlja najsigurniju investiciju, i prilikom svakih previranja na dioničkim burzama investitori bježe od svega što se čini imalo riskantnim i gurnu svoj novac u super sigurnu američku obveznicu – kao primjer ovdje je 3 Month Tresury Bill. (kratkoročne su Bill, dugoročne Bonds) Zbog velikog kupovanja cijena obveznice skoči, a zbog inverzne veze cijene i prinosa, prinos (yield) padne. U vrijeme najvećih problema nakon bankrota Lehmana, prinos na 3 mjesečnu obevzniu je dosegnuo nevjerovatno niskih 0.02%. Povećanje prinosa bi bila indikacija da investitori izlaze iz sigurnosti američke obveznice i stavljaju svoj novac u neke druge, rizičnije instrumente. Prinos bi trebao biti bliže Fed funds rate.

TED stopa je razlika između gornje dvije stope i tako posebno dobro sumira stanje/pritiske na kreditnom tržištu. Konkretnije, TED = 3MLibor – 3TreasuryBill. Razmljivim riječnikom što to znači? Što je veći TED to je veći kreditni rizik u odnosu na ne-rizičnu američku obveznicu. Znamo da je 3MLibor kamatna stopa koju banke naplaćuju jedna drugoj za tromjesečni kredit; taj kredit je neosiguran. 3TBill je kamata na sigurnu, likvidnu, tromjesečnu američki obveznicu; kamata koju američka vlada plaća bankama za tromjesečni kredit. Ako su banke u dobrom stanju, tj. ako banke imaju povjerenja jedna u drugu, trebale bi biti voljne izdavati neosigurane kredite jedna drugoj za gotovo istu kamatnu stopu kao i američkoj vladi gdje im je povrat novca garantiran. Kad 3MLibor krene gore zbog već spomenutih razloga, što znači da banke traže velike kamatne premije od drugih banaka, a prinos na tromjesečnu američku obveznicu se sruši, što znači da su američkoj vladi voljne posuditi novac za beznačajno niski povrat samo da su sigurni, TED razlika ukazuje na strah bankara. Strah bankare primorava da zahtjevaju sve veću kamatnu premiju. Kad banke same ne mogu posuditi potreban novac kako bi zadovoljile svoje potrebe, novac za kredite kompanijama isto presuši – a u ovakvim situacijama naglo.

Kao što se vidi iz grafa niže, u posljednjih par godina TED razlika bila je na otprilike 0.2% – 0.5%. Nedavni leveli od 3, 4, skoro 5% predstavljaju ogromnu premiju za rizik. Kompanije koje posuđuju novac od banaka imaju kredite vezane za Libor plus kojih 1/4% kao premiju. Kad se rizična premija proširi ovako brzo na ovakve levele, izvori financiranja za kompanije efektivno presuše. Svaki pad TEDa je pomak u boljem smjeru, a povratak na ili blizu povijesne razlike je znak prestanka krize/panike.

(Detaljnije objašnjenje o TED spreadu ovdje. Marginal Revolution ima odličan dugoročni graf, od 1971, TED spread. ’70tih i ’80tih TED je bio daleko veći i više fluktuirao nego ovaj danas.)

No, kompanije (financijske i ne-financijske) i poduzetnici umjesto da posuđuju od banaka, mogu posuđivati direktno od investitora na tržištu novca izdavanjem commercial paper. Commercial paper, ili komercijalni zapisi po našu, su kreditni, dužnički, instrumenti koje kompanije izdaju i obavezaju se isplatiti za koji mjesec, dakle u kratkom roku. Izdana količina tih instrumenata daje uvid u stanje tržišta kratkoročnih zajmova – i ono nije dobro – što isto reflektira na ekonomsku situaciju. Kompanije izdavanjem komer. zapisa financiraju kratkoročne, dnevne, gotovinske potrebe (plaće, račune, nabavu) ali i operativni kapital. Smanjenje ovog tržišta, tj. nevoljkost zajmodavaca da financiraju zatvara još jednu aveniju regularnog i nužnog financiranja kompanija.

Dva grafa lijevo su prilično razumljiva. U 7. mjesecu prošle godine, tržište ukupnih količina izdanih zapisa je doseglo vrhunac sa oko $2,222 bilijuna vrijednosti. Od onda se se strmoglavilo, posebice na početku krize te tokom posljednjih par tjedana kada se smanjilo na manje od $1,5 bilijuna. To ukazuje da zajmodavci uskraćuju kratkoročno kreditiranje kompanijama en masse – sve više kompanija, čak respektabilnih poput GE, je izgurano iz tržišta zapisa; sve više novca se posuđuje samo na ultra-kratke rokove. Primjerice, između Rujna i Listopada $160 milijardi je išlo na zajmove koji moraju biti vraćeni za 1 do 4 dana. Jedva $3 milijarde je išlo na zajmove sa rokom povratka od +81 dan. Kreditori se jednostavno ne žele odvojiti, zbog straha, od svog novca na duža

razdoblja. Kao što je već rečeno, tri mjeseca je dugo razdoblje puno magle.

Osim volumena izdanih komercijalnih zapisa, bitne su i kamatne stope. Kamatne stope za komercijalne zapise se određuju tržišno i pošto nose određeni rizika neplaćanja (neispunjenja ugovornih obveza; default risk) stope su nešto više od prinosa na sigurne državne obveznice. Uz to, zbog rizik neplaćanja stvara se razliku među kamatama na razne kvalitete komercijalnih zapisa. Visoko kvalitetni komercijalni zapisi, uglavnom izdani od lidera poput GE, ocjenjeni su sa AA (nekad A1/P1). Komercijalni zapisi niže kvalitete, izdanih od slabijih kompanija, nose ocjene A2/P2. FED redovno objavljuje razliku među tim tridesetdnevni zapisima zvanu A2/P2 spread. On ukazuje na mogućnost neplaćanja od strane slabijih, A2/P2 komapnija. Kao što je vidljivo iz grafa niže, razlika između kamata za visokokvalitetne i niskokvalitetne kompanije je probila krov. Obično za vrijeme recesije A2/P2 spread skoči, no financijska kriza je uzrokovala pravu eksploziju.

Mogli bi još kopati po distresnim simptomima tržišta za mnoge druge vrsta zajmova. Vrijednosti kredita korporacijama i njihovih obveznica su se srozale (obveznica 7% samo u Rujnu), što znači da su prinosi skočili. Velike količine novca koje se posuđuju kompanijama i koje aranžiraju timovi banaka je u prvih 9 mjeseci ove godine pao za 40%, na $2.3 bilijuna.

Zgodan sažetak spomenutih indikatora je na slici ispod. Primjećuje se postepeno poboljšanje. (Klik za interaktivni graf.)

Ukratko, još par drugih indikatora isto daje uvid na prilično veliki stres, koji se sada počeo smanjivati, na financijskim tržištima. U publikaciji HUBa koju sam neki dan linkao kao dobar sažetak, na hrvatskom, o današnjoj krizi istaknut je Libor-OIS spread. Opširnije objašnjenje tog spreada, koje je ujedno i kompleksnije, nalazi se u HUBovoj analizi na stranici 21. Dovoljno je reći da Libor-OIS razlika vrlo koristan indikator o uspijehu centralnih banaka i država da razbiju grčk u kojem se kreditna tržišta nalaze, tj. situacije u kojoj banke ne žele posuđivati jedna drugoj. Libor-OIS služi kao mjera o riziku koji banke vide u posuđivanju jedna drugoj – kad se raste znači da banke traže veću kamatu jer smatraju da je rizik neplaćanja velik; obrnuto kada smatraju da je rizik neplaćanja manji. mjera je dostupnosti sredstava na tržištu novca, tj. kao mjerilo nedostatka gotovine. Kao i sa gornjim indikatorima, niži spread je bolji – ukazuje na vraćanje povjerenja. Gradf ispod je nešto stariji, ali pokazuje spreadove kamatnih stopa više zemalja sa OIS. Nešto svježiji graf koji pokazuje povijesnu eksploziju Libor-OIS (više od 6 puta standardnu devijaciju nad povijesnim spreadom) je ovdje.

Ima još indikatora, kao primjerice Y2 swap – Y2 Treasury. Vidi ovdje.

Odličan obrazovni izvor, iako malo već star, o svim ovim instrumentima tržišta novca i mehanizmima je publikacija (besplatna; u pdfu) Instruments of the Money Market, Federal Reserve Banke of Richmond.

Postoji i druga strana ove priče – da sve ove kamatne stope i razlike ne predstavljaju dokaz o credit crunchu. Prošli tjedan FRB Minneapolis objavila je kratki radni papir (niti 3 stranice u početku, a sada izgleda da je prošireno na 6 + mnoštvo grafova) o 4 mita ove Financijske Krize. Rad je stvorio malu senzaciju na internetu jer naizgled vrlo jednostavnim metodama pokazuje da su ova četiri vjerovanja pogrešna …

1. Bank lending to nonfinancial corporations and individuals has declined sharply.
2. Interbank lending is essentially nonexistent.
3. Commercial paper issuance by nonfinancial corporations has declined sharply and rates have risen to unprecedented levels.
4. Banks play a large role in channeling funds from savers to borrowers.

… i tako zapravo nema Credit Cruncha. Što bi to značilo je da zapravo financijska kriza neće imati posljedice na realnu ekonomiju (npr. zaposlenost); da paralizirana kreditna tržišta neće potegnuti američku i druge velike ekonomije dolje. Svakako da je realna ekonomija počela usporavati i prije nedavnih potresa i bankrota, ali da banke ne posuđuju potrošačima i biznisima jednostavno nije istina. Mnogi su napali studiju i one, bez obzira koliko poznati, koji joj olako daju priznanje da na lagani način dokazuje kako zapravo nema Credit Cruncha i svih navednih problema na financijskim tržištima. Tabarrok sa MarginalRevolution uopće je ne naziva situaciju kreditnom krizom, već panikom. Par dobrih kritika, a vi pratite dalje linkove.

Some of the Conclusions Drawn are Simply False

Analysis! (Ukazuje na A2/P2 kao važniji indikator)

Four Myths of the Credit Crisis, Again

Four “Myths”? (Posebno zanimljiv sa mnoštvo grafova ka odgovor Tabarroku)

Economists with Pseudo-Knowledge (Neki zanimljivi pointeri. Posebno sočan komentar prije kraju teksta.)

More on Credit Crunch Myths. (Neka pažljiva priznanja mitova krize i diskusija “cijena” vs. “količina” argumenata)

Credit Crunch: Did We Make It All Up? (Skepticizam oko čvrstoće argumenta)

Rad postavlja neke zanimljive teze. Nekako ta rasprava o stanju na kreditnim i novčanim tržištima ovisi i o nazivu i što se pod njim smatra. Ako je problem u nazivu, ne mora bit Credit Crunch. Možda do potpunog cruncha još ne dolazi jer su tržišta zamrznuta, već je problem u likvidnosti. (?) Predsjednik FED Boston Eric Rosengren je u nedavnom govoru upotrijebio termin “liquidity lock.”

Recall that a loan is counted as an asset on a bank’s balance sheet. Banks hold capital in part to reserve against the possibility that a loan defaults, and must maintain a reasonable ratio of capital to assets. If a bank experiences a reduction in the value of its capital, it must take steps to shrink the asset side of its balance sheet in order to restore its desired capital-to-assets ratio. In other words, the bank becomes more restrictive in its lending. This is no small matter for the broader economy when you consider that, thanks to leverage, when a bank’s capital declines, the bank must reduce its loans by much more to maintain its capital-to-assets ratio.

In addition to this state of affairs, often referred to as a “credit crunch,” a new and unwelcome wrinkle to the financial turmoil is occurring in many short-term credit markets − something you might call a “liquidity lock.” By liquidity lock, I am referring to extreme risk aversion by many investors and institutions, which makes short-term financing difficult to come by for even the most creditworthy firms – including financing for very short maturities, measured in days.

Govor svakako pročitajte.

Glavni uzrok krize je nedostatak efikasne demokratske kontrole nad kapitalom u Sjedinjenim Državama, što je omogućilo da se stvori financijski mjehur od sapunice (koji je puknuo na kreditiranju stambene izgradnje). Na prenapuhan mjehur se upozoravalo godinama, ali u Bijeloj kući je bio nesposoban, nekvalificiran Predsjednik, koji nije znao niti odabrati kvalificirane savjetnike, nasljednik republikanskih administracija koje su, počam od Reagana, slijedeći Friedmanove modele, demontirale i one oskudne modele regulacije koje je uveo Franklin D. Roosevelt nakon pogubne krize 1929.

Nema boljeg i lakšeg nego spomenuti i boldati Reagana, Friedmana, Busha i deregulaciju te tako kvalitetno, ispravno i vrlo precizno ukazati na pravi uzrok krize. Tko bi živ mogao sumnjati, pogotovo u hrvatskoj javnosti koja je tako dobro upoznata sa američkom financijskom povijesti, da ovo nije točno kad su spomenuti svi “usual suspects”. Zlikovci i nesposobnjakovići američke desnice su krivi.

Osim šta je najveća deregulacija bankarskog sektora došla za vrijeme Demokratskog predsjednika Clintona. 1999. Clinton sa mnogim istaknutim Demokratima u Kongresu – među njima i Obamin VP kandidat Joe Biden – potpisao je Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act kojim su “demontirani” djelovi “oskudne” FDR-ove Glass-Steagall regulacije iz 1933., ponajviše razdvajanje komercijalnog od investicijskog bankarstva. Ako je deregulacija kriva za sve ovo, zašto se kod nas prelazi preko ovog?? Barack Obama je skoro svakodnevno krivio deregulaciju iz 1999. jer je jedan od autora, Phil Gramm, McCainov savjetnik. Sve dok se nisu “sporazumili” da je i Biden glasao za nju i nakon što ga je sam Bill Clinton ‘podučio’ braneći akt iz ’99. Onda je meta napada postao a tko drugi nego Bush. Vjerojatno se kod nas to zataškava jer nije djelo uobičajenih zlikovaca desnice, pa da se povera hrvatska javnost ne zbuni neprijaznim istinama.

A nema se oko čega zbuniti. Svi financijski instrumenti koji su danas u središtu pozornosti nemaju nikakve veze sa deregulacijom i svi su bili dostupni bankama za trgovanje prije ’99. Upravo ta “deregulacija” je jedna od najdobrodošlijih u ovim burnim vremenima jer je omogućila spajanje BearStearnsa sa JPMorganom, Merrila sa Bank of America komercijalnom bankom. Ali ne morate vjerovati meni, sam Clinton to kaže. Krajem Rujna, a Beškerov komentar je došao tri tjedna poslje, Clinton je dao intervju za BusinessWeek i iznjeo svoje mišljenje o tom/svom deregulativnom potezu. Ne samo da ne krivi sam sebe (iznenađujuće!) već ni republikanca Phil Gramma.

MB – Mr. President, in 1999 you signed a bill essentially rolling back Glass-Steagall and deregulating banking. In light of what has gone on, do you regret that decision?

Clinton – No, because it wasn’t a complete deregulation at all. We still have heavy regulations and insurance on bank deposits, requirements on banks for capital and for disclosure. I thought at the time that it might lead to more stable investments and a reduced pressure on Wall Street to produce quarterly profits that were always bigger than the previous quarter. But I have really thought about this a lot. I don’t see that signing that bill had anything to do with the current crisis. Indeed, one of the things that has helped stabilize the current situation as much as it has is the purchase of Merrill Lynch (MER) by Bank of America (BAC), which was much smoother than it would have been if I hadn’t signed that bill.

MB – Did he (Phil Gramm) sell you a bill of goods?
Clinton – Not on this bill I don’t think he did. You know, Phil Gramm and I disagreed on a lot of things, but he can’t possibly be wrong about everything. On the Glass-Steagall thing, like I said, if you could demonstrate to me that it was a mistake, I’d be glad to look at the evidence. But I can’t blame [the Republicans]. This wasn’t something they forced me into. I really believed that given the level of oversight of banks and their ability to have more patient capital, if you made it possible for [commercial banks] to go into the investment banking business as Continental European investment banks could always do, that it might give us a more stable source of long-term investment.

Iceland’s central bank had only €2 billion in foreign currency reserves — while the banks had reached about €100 billion in assets — meaning it was effectively unable to fill its role as lender of last resort. The reserves were “woefully inadequate,” says Mr. Magnusson. Mr. Oddsson, in his TV interview, said foreign-exchange reserves weren’t the issue. “People started yelling that we must enlarge the foreign-currency reserves in step with the banks’ growth. A totally wrong theory,” he said. “We should have cut the banking system down.”

Asked by telephone if the central bank should have boosted reserves as its banks swelled, Mr. Oddsson said: “We have more foreign reserves per capita than most” countries. Iceland has only 300,000 people.

Iceland was unwilling to use unorthodox tools to provide more backing to its system. Lars Christensen, an analyst at Danske Bank, points to Croatia, which required banks to hold foreign currency in a special account with the central bank in proportion to overseas commitments. Croatia now has that capital to deploy.

Ipak priča nije gotova za Istočnu Europu. Tek počinje. Tržišta su hirovita, ali kalkulirajuća. Iz Telegrapha jučer. Deficit našeg tekućeg računa za 2008. se očekuje oko 10.1%. Za 2007. je bio 8.6%.

“We doubt the effect will be long-lasting,” said Lars Christensen, East Europe strategist at Danske Bank. “The markets are very likely to test how far the central bank is willing to go.”

Simon Derrick, from Bank of New York Mellon, said the rate rise was probably doomed to failure. “As soon as you see aggressive actions like this when the economy is not strong to take it, you know it is unsustainable,” he said.

There is a risk is that hedge funds will pick off those East European states with big current account deficits that rely on foreign financing, smashing the pegs or ‘dirty-floats’ one by one. The deficits have reached 23pc of GDP in Bulgaria, 16pc in Estonia, and 16pc in Romania….

….

Maya Bhandiri, from Lombard Street Research, said Hungary was primed for crisis after letting rip on foreign credit, letting net external debt reach 90pc of GDP.

Some 60pc of all mortgages and car loans are funded in foreign currencies, mostly euros or Swiss francs. Hungary’s government is now letting debtors switch franc loans into forints and even forgive debts in what amounts to a bail-out of the most reckless. Unicredit warned that this may cause markets to question the credit-worthiness of the state itself.

The Baltic States, Poland, Croatia, and Romania have also let foreign mortgages proliferate. Mr Christensen says the region is even more overstretched than East Asia on the cusp of the 1998 crisis. “Imbalances have grown to unsustainable levels. The unwinding is likely to be painful and disorderly. There is a clear risk of the situation getting out of hand, with serious implications for Western Europe,” he said.

In the last 10 years, Krugman has achieved fame in a much larger arena with his columns in the New York Times. These offer strong views on economics and politics, and they have been harshly critical of the Bush administration on most issues. It is no wonder that they attract adulation from readers who share his views on these matters and hatred from the other side. The former delight in his Nobel Prize, and the latter are shocked and dismayed by it, but both these reactions are mistaken. The prize has nothing to do with the Op Ed columns and would have come to Krugman just the same if he had never written a single one of them. The prize celebrates his achievements in science, not in the policy arena. It is therefore important to summarise and clarify exactly what those achievements are.

In any case, Congratulations!

Najpoznatiji svjetski ekonomist lijevice kako ga naziva Bryan Caplan, je ipak daleko progresivniji u svojim teroijama i zagovaranjima od bilo kojeg našeg ekonomista lijevice. Imamo mnogo za naučiti ovdje. Tyler Cowen sa Marginal Revolution bloga ima daleko najbolji komentar u blogosferi. Sa pregršt linkova materijala za čitanje ima na pregršt. NYT-ov blog Economix ima kratki intervju sa Krugmanon koji i sam priznaje da nije očekivao ovaj dan tako rano. Justin Fox sa Times-ovog bloga isto ima zanimljiv pregled i komentar o ovogodišnjem Nobelu. Ispravno primjećuje, kao što su mnoge agencije objavile vijest, o spekulaciji da su Šveđani nagradili Krugmana za njegovu kritiku Predsjednika Busha (ja u to ne vjerujem). MisesBlog, valjda vođen Hayekovim protivljenjem Nobelovoj nagradi za ekonomsku znanost, omalovažava vrijednost pobjednika i Švedske Akademije.

Ispod je članak Economista iz Travnja ove godine kao dobar uvod u Krugmanov rad i utjecaj. (Neki linkovi na radove ne rade.)

“THIS paper is the manifestation of a guilty conscience.” With those words, Paul Krugman began the recent presentation of his new study of trade and wages at the Brookings Institution. Mr Krugman, a leading trade economist (as well as a New York Times columnist), had concluded in a 1995 Brookings paper* that trade with poor countries played only a small role in America’s rising wage inequality, explaining perhaps one-tenth of the widening income gap between skilled and unskilled workers during the 1980s. Together with several studies in the mid-1990s that had similar findings, Mr Krugman’s paper convinced economists that trade was a bit-part player in causing inequality. Other factors, particularly technological innovation that favoured those with skills, were much more important.

At some level that was a surprise. In theory, although trade brings gains to the economy as a whole, it can have substantial effects on the distribution of income. When a country with relatively more high-skilled workers (such as America) trades with poorer countries that have relatively more low-skilled workers, America’s low skilled will lose out. But when the effect appeared modest, economists heaved a sigh of relief and moved on.

In recent years, however, the issue has returned. Opinion polls suggest that Americans have become increasingly convinced that globalisation harms ordinary workers. As a commentator, Mr Krugman has become more sceptical. “It’s no longer safe to assert that trade’s impact on the income distribution in wealthy countries is fairly minor,” he wrote on the VoxEU blog last year. “There’s a good case that it is big and getting bigger.” He offered two reasons why. First, more of America’s trade is with poor countries, such as China. Second, the growing fragmentation of production means more tasks have become tradable, increasing the universe of labour-intensive jobs in which Chinese workers compete with Americans. His new paper set out to substantiate these assertions.

That proved hard. Certainly, America’s trade patterns have changed. Poor countries’ share of commerce in manufactured goods has doubled. In contrast to the 1980s, the average wage of America’s top-ten trading partners has fallen since 1990. All of which, you might think, would increase the impact of trade on wage inequality.

But by how much? If you simply update the approach used in Mr Krugman’s 1995 paper to take into account today’s trade patterns, you find that the effect on wages has increased. Josh Bivens, of the Economic Policy Institute, a Washington, DC, think-tank, did just that and found that trade widened wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers by 6.9% in 2006 and 4.8% in 1995. But even with that increase, trade is still far from being the main cause of wage inequality. Lawrence Katz, a Harvard economist who discussed Mr Krugman’s paper at Brookings, estimates that, using Mr Bivens’s approach, trade with poor countries can account for about 15% of the growth in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers since 1979.

Even this is almost certainly an overstatement. Many imports from China have moved up-market from easy-to-produce products, such as footwear, to more sophisticated goods, such as computers and electronics. As a result, to use economists’ jargon, the “factor content” of American imports—in effect, the amount of skilled labour they contain—has not shifted downwards. Mr Katz says factor-based models suggest trade with poor countries explains only 5% of rising income inequality.

Mr Krugman argues that the effect is bigger, but that import statistics are too coarse to capture it. Thanks to the fragmentation of production, Chinese workers are doing the low-skill parts of producing computers. Just because computers from China are classified as skill-intensive in America’s imports does not prevent them from hurting less-skilled American workers. Mr Krugman may be right but, as he admits, it is hard to prove.

Blame it on the rich

Robert Lawrence, another Harvard economist, has looked at the same evidence and reached rather different conclusions. In a new book, “Blue Collar Blues”, he points out that the contours of American inequality sit ill with the idea that trade with poor countries is to blame. Once you measure income properly, the gap between white- and blue-collar workers has not risen that much since the late 1990s when China’s global integration accelerated. The wages of the least skilled have improved relative to those in the middle. Some types of inequality have increased, notably the share of income going to the very richest. But there is little sign that wage inequality has behaved as traditional trade theory might suggest.

Mr Lawrence offers two reasons why. One possibility is that America no longer makes some of the low-skilled, labour-intensive goods that it imports. In those goods there are no domestic workers to lose out to foreign competition. Second, even when America does produce something that is imported from China, it may make it in a different way, with more machinery and only a few high-skilled workers. If imports from China and other poor countries compete with more-skilled American workers, they may displace workers but will not widen wage inequality.

Given the lack of fine-grained statistics, none of these studies settles the debate. It is possible that globalisation is becoming a bigger cause of American wage inequality. But contrary to the tone of the political debate, and the thrust of Mr Krugman’s commentary, the evidence is inconclusive. “How can we quantify the actual effect of rising trade on wages?” Mr Krugman asked at the end of his paper. “The answer, given the current state of the data, is that we can’t.”
* Sources

“Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences”, by Paul Krugman, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:1995

“Blue Collar Blues: Is Trade to Blame for Rising US Income Inequality?”, by Robert Z. Lawrence, Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2008

“Trade and Wages, Reconsidered”, by Paul Krugman, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (forthcoming – a draft version is available)

“Globalisation, American Wages and Inequality”, by Josh Bivens, EPI Working Paper 279, 2007

Vjerujem da su zainteresirani pratili čitav vikend po stranim servisima najave i polu-najave. MMF upozorava na globalni kolaps financijskih tržišta. Strauss Kahn upozorava da su briga o solventnosti velikih financijskih kuća u Us i Eu gurnule financijski sistem na rub sistemskog raspada. Europski čelnici (15 zemalja koje djele Euro) su, navodno, blizu konkretnog dogovora o potpori bankarskog sustava. Tržišta će biti … ahm … vidno razočarana sa nedostatkom dramatičnijih poteza iz zemalja G7, kaže Laurence Meyer bivši FED guverner. Prve rezultate tog predviđanja ćemo vidjeti već za par sati kad se otvore tržišta Istočne Azije.

Sljedeći tjedan test za dionička tržišta i ukupnu financjisku krizu će biti jedna banka – Morgan Stanley. WSJ piše:

Panic has reached fever pitch. Morgan Stanley’s shares have come under severe pressure, including a 26% drop Thursday, as investors bet it’s the latest Wall Street firm to get into trouble. But if Morgan Stanley pulls through, it would represent an important milestone in the search for a stock-market bottom. At some point, a high-profile financial firm will survive fear-stoked selling. When that happens, it might abate.

Barry Ritholtz na svom blogu daje pregršt linkova o mišljenjima, odgovorima na krizu i savjetima o riješavanju. Svakako za pogledati za one kojima nije dosta čitanja o trenutnoj situaciji. Na RGEconomics Fabisu Maximus daje sažetak rezultata MMFovog sastanka kojeg naziva najvažnijim međunarodnim sastankom desetljeća.

A u ponedjeljak nas čeka dodjela objava posljednjeg Nobela. NYT-ov Economix blog ima sažetak predviđanja i rezultat na kladionicama. Nema neke razlike od onoga što sam ja pisao prošli tjedan.

Dow 8,579.19 -678.91 (-7.33%)

S&P 500 909.92 -75.02 (-7.62%)

Prošla je točno godina dana od kad je DowJones Index, po prvi put u povijesti, dotaknuo rekordnih 14,164.53. Od onda je izgubio 39%. Iako sadrži samo 30 kompanija, DJIA predstavlja nešto manje od 30% kapitalizacije američkog tržišta.

S&P 500 je od rekorda na 1565 prošle godine pa na 909, izgubivši 37%. Taj indeks je ispravnije mjerilo dnevnog performansa dioničkog tržišta pošto predstavlja skoro 80% kapitalizacije ukupnog američkog tržišta.

Jednostavan graf DJIA i S&P 500 za posljednje dvije godine. (Klik za uvećanje)

DJIA nije bio ispod 9000 bodova od 2003. Strah o lošem stanju bankarskog sektora i utjecaj toga na realnu ekonomiju je jedan od glavnih faktora u drastičnim tržišnim padovima posljednjih dana. Banke i financijske institutcije su pod najvećim udarima, najviše pate. Dow Jones Wilshire US Banks Index je pao 11% jučer i 53.4% u posljednjih godinu dana, usporedbi sa -41.76% za S&500. (Graf ispod)

U posljednje 3 godine (graf ispod) isti bankovni indeks je dolje -47.29% u usporedbi sa -24.49% za S&P500.

Nedavni gubitci na tržištima predstavljaju jedan najgorih medvjeđih tržišta (bear market) u desetljećima. Službena definicija tržišnog kraha je pad od 20% u jednom danu ili par dana zaredom, što se dogodilio 1929. i 1987. i što trenutno tržište gotov pa i ispunjava.

Mrak, možeš slikati ovog medvjeda??

Evo još par komentara, via WSJ.

• U.S. stocks, as measured by the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000, shed $872 billion in market value on Thursday, $2.5 trillion over the last seven trading sessions, and $8.4 trillion since hitting an all-time high one year ago Thursday. The index includes almost all U.S. public companies. (Zapravo nema službenog broja javnih kompanija na američkom tržištu, i.e. onih koje trguju na burzi. Po nekim procjenama ima ih i do 15000.)
  
• “We are in a secular bear market,” says Russ Koesterich, head of investment strategy at Barclays Global Investors in San Francisco, using Wall Street jargon for this kind of prolonged weak period. Analysts distinguish between long-running “secular” periods and shorter-term bear markets, such as the one that occurred from 2000 through 2002.
• The way some investors see it, if the government feels the need to intervene more drastically, the problem might be even larger than it had seemed. That kind of self-reinforcing fear is symptomatic of a secular bear market, where bearish sentiment trumps fundamentals.
• “We had a secular bear market from 1968 to 1982, and another that began in 1929,” Mr. Koesterich says. Stocks sometimes mount strong rallies during the lengthy weak periods. They nearly doubled in value from 2002 through 2007, but have since given back most of those gains.
• The size of the Dow’s recent declines surpasses anything seen in the past two bear markets, and is the largest seven-session percentage drop since the days surrounding the 1987 crash.
• At the height of the 1990s bull market, the price of stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index rose to more than 30 times company profits, a record level that was more than twice the historical average. Between March 2000 and October 2002, the S&P 500 fell 49%, but its price-to-earnings ratio never fell to the historical average of 15 or 16. To some market analysts, that meant stock values were still too high and investors were still too optimistic.
• At Thursday’s close, the price-to-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 was down to 10.7, the lowest since the early 1980s.
• Traders and analysts say that markets remain in the grip of an increasingly self-fulfilling bearish view. Each day’s market drop sparks worries that fuel the next’s, and each day of high borrowing costs between banks is interpreted as evidence that risks remain high, which props up the next day’s rates. “Psychology is not allowing what the economics textbook says should happen to actually happen,” said strategist Doug Peta, of the New York portfolio-management firm J. & W. Seligman.

Ipak, samo jedna stvar će zaustaviti/primiriti paniku i zaustaviti nediskriminirajuću rasprodaju. Više o tome uskoro.

According to data from the British Bankers’ Association, overnight U.S. dollar Libor fell slightly from Wednesday’s fixing. But longer-term funding pressures tightened. The key three-month Libor rate rose to 4.75% from 4.52% .

Those rates are key to setting credit levels that banks charge their clients, including companies whose activities drive growth. “Every single business in the world needs working capital,” said Mr. Peta. “You need to spend money to make something before you can sell it, which is what generates your profits, which is what drives the stock market.”

“This is indiscriminate selling,” said trader Todd Salamone, of Schaeffer’s Investment Research, an analysis and asset-management firm in Cincinnati. “Not until there are massive improvements in the credit markets are we likely to see this really end.“

Novi Global Competitiveness Report u izdanju World Economic Foruma rangiran naš bankarski sustav na 56. mjestu od 134. sa ocjenom 5.8/7.0. Većina Istočno Europskih Zemalja je iza nas. Estonija (25.) i Letonija (41.) su jedine ispred nas. Zemlje koje ne vidite na tablici niže: Bugarska i Mađarska (80. i 81.), BiH (96.) Makedonija (102.), Srbija (110.).

Prvih deset i posljednjih deset rangiranih vidite ovdje.

Kao i prošle godine i dalje navijam (subjektivno) za Barro-a, drugi bi bio Feldstein. Fama bi isto već trebao dobiti. Kandidati po ThompsonScientificu su rangirani mnogo niže.

Međunardoni dolasci – nakaradno. Ovdje vrijedi opis Denisa Kuljiša u članku u Jutarnjem, o kojem sam pisao ovo ljeto. Sve je ograđeno šperpločama, uključujući prilaz kontroli putovnica i nakon toga čekaonicu za prtljagu. Drvena vrata kroz šper-zid, sa znakom zabrane otvaranja, ograđuju odlaske i dolaske. “Samo se krpa i majstoriše.” Zašto??

Domaći odlasci – strašno nakaradno; Kad sam ja čekao, kasno navečer, posljednji let, terminal je bio osvjetljen sa 7 golih žarulja, (bez ijedne lampe, svjetiljke, lustera) od toga 4 su bile obične 100W (a možda i manje). Uz žarulje, svjetlo je davalo i par ekrana iznad gateova. Naravno instalirane rasvjete nije moglo ni biti kad terminal nema pravi strop. Sve žice, kablovi i cijevi su bile na izložbi, a u pozadini crni, kao tek zagoren zid. Terminal nema wc, pa ako vam zatreba morate nazad iza osiguranja i onda opet kroz osiguranje. Osjećaj trećeg svijeta.

Domaći dolasci – dobro i jednostavno (valjda zato jer je i novo). Na dolascima i ne treba biti puno filozofije, ali bar da se ne hoda po šperločama. Međunarodni odlasci – ispada da je i jedini terminal koji je reprezentabilan i međunarodno usporediv. Sa barom, duty-freeom i (vrlo važno!) lako dostupnim wc-om.

Naravno da ovakvo izdanje zavrijeđuje renovaciju, tj. izgradi novo. Nema se šta više krpariti po “starom”. Sada je legitimno pitanje što i za koliko izgraditi. O potrebi i razlogu nove zgrade za Pleso sam već pisao. Kao i posljedicama izgradnje nepotrebno skupih arhitektonskih remekdjela – troškovi se na kraju svale na avio kompanije i letače. To svakako nije način za privuči više kompanija i više letača. A u slučaju Plesa, potencijalna situacija je još gora jer će novu zgradu financirati Vlada poreznim novcem svih građana Hrvatske i grad bez ikakve odgovornosti za potrošnju, a potom troškovi otplate kredita biti svaljeni na opet poreznike/letače.

Problem je jednostavan. Veliki gradovi (ili hoćemo-biti-veliki-grad poput Zagreba) troše prevelike svote novca, a ponekad i poreznog novca, za izgradnju aerodrosmkih katedrala, dok bi jednostavnije i jeftinije zgrade, koje ne opterećuju naknadno putnike glomaznim naknadama za isplatu troškova izgradnje, služile istoj svrsi. Pa tako i u Hrvatskoj sa izgradnjom €300 milijunskog novog Plesa.

Neidhardt – Novi putnički terminal učinit će zagrebačku zračnu luku vrhunskim svjetskim aerodromom i prvorazrednim obilježjem suvremenog identiteta Zagreba i Hrvatske.

Identitet nije svrha aerodroma! Zato se IATA pobunila i rekla “Ne želimo plaćati katedrale!” Članak (ispod) od prije 2 i pol godine u WSJ objašnjava probleme političke ekonomije izgradnje aerodroma, tko ih plaća, tko i što bi ih trebalo isplaćivati, tj. kroz koje prihode (ne porezne) te ustrojstvo aerodroma.

Politics & Economics: Airport Improvements Stir Up Fights Over Fees; Tussle at Charles de Gaulle Underlines Brewing Tension Between Operators, Airlines

Adam Cohen. Wall Street Journal. (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Apr 25, 2006.

ROISSY, FRANCE — Charles De Gaulle Airport has become the latest front in a global battle in which air carriers have attacked airports from Toronto to Tokyo for lavish spending and fat fees that airlines and their passengers end up paying.

The conflict underlines a struggle over who should pay for airport- infrastructure improvements and raises questions about whether airports are best run with public or private funding.

Charles de Gaulle’s owner, Aeroports de Paris SA, which yesterday said it filed for an initial public offering, is raising the fees it charges airlines in order to fund more than 1 billion euros ($1.23 billion) in infrastructure improvements.

Airlines, led by Air France-KLM, are furious that the airport’s fees have climbed 26.5% during the past five years and are slated to rise another 5% over each of the next five years. They are calling on the European Union to regulate airport charges.

In the U.S., airports are government-owned and rely largely on public funds — a mix of federal money and tax-free municipal-bond issues — and investments by airlines, which often build their own terminal buildings. That doesn’t make them inexpensive, however. Airlines rank New Jersey’s Newark Liberty International and New York’s John F. Kennedy International as two of the most expensive airports in the world.

In Europe, where many airports were originally state-owned, governments recently have turned to privatization, following the example of the United Kingdom, which sold off London’s airports in 1987.

While many of Europe’s airports have been privatized and weaned from state funds, Charles de Gaulle’s owner, Aeroports de Paris, is a latecomer. It was changed from a state entity to a state-owned company last year. It is now a for-profit business, receiving no direct public subsidies. The company plans to collect 500 million euros to 600 million euros by selling off less than half of its shares. The French state plans to keep a controlling stake in the company.

Aeroports de Paris is renovating Charles de Gaulle’s Terminal 1, expanding Terminal 2 to accommodate more traffic and Airbus’s new double-decker A380 and building a train to link the terminals. When Terminal 1 opened in 1974, the windowless concrete doughnut with moving walkways suspended in clear plastic tubes was considered avant- garde. But the terminal now handles almost twice as many passengers as initially planned.

“This place is confusing and outdated,” said Colorado native Jeremy Turpen, on his way to Tanzania to climb Mount Kilimanjaro. He motioned toward the jumble of signs and crowded check-in counters in an area of the terminal that hasn’t been redone with sleek flat-screen displays and space-saving counters.

Making the terminal less confusing and adding modern amenities like wireless Internet access will take four years and cost 250 million euros, according to Aeroports de Paris. Company officials complain that airlines asked for these improvements but are unwilling to pay for them.

European airport operators say their charges reflect costly investments. Airlines say Charles de Gaulle, Athens International, Toronto’s Pearson International and other airports are spending too much to build architectural masterpieces when cheaper, simpler terminals would suffice. “We don’t want to pay for cathedrals,” said Giovanni Bisignani, head of the International Air Transport Association, the airline lobby leading the push for a single European regulator.

IATA also says Aeroports de Paris is violating international aviation rules that bar airports from charging for infrastructure before it is built. Mr. Bisignani charges that, ahead of Aeroports de Paris’s public offering, the French government is “fattening up the airport to sell it at a higher price.”

EU Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot recently met with airlines and airport operators to discuss the tension and “hopes they will work out the problem themselves,” said spokesman Stefaan De Rynck. If not, he says the EU could step in this fall with a proposal for regulation.

Airlines contrast Charles de Gaulle with London’s Heathrow, Europe’s busiest airport. Heathrow is owned by BAA PLC, which was the world’s first big privatized airport company in 1987. Like Aeroports de Paris, BAA needs government permission to raise its charges.

Mr. Bisignani noted that the U.K.’s Civil Aviation Authority has allowed BAA to raise prices but only at a modest rate, encouraging the airport company to find revenue elsewhere. He said the U.K. regulator keeps BAA on a tight leash, while a similar French authority established last year rubber-stamped Aeroports de Paris’s requested price increase.

French Civil Aviation Authority spokeswoman Marie Bertin said the company is “making a lot of big investments.” She said the issue is complicated because Air France, which was only recently privatized, didn’t pay anything to use the airport for many years.

BAA, which owns seven U.K. airports, last year made a profit of GBP 672 million ($1.2 billion). Much of this income came from its airports’ retail shops, parking fees and property leases to hotels and offices. Of Heathrow’s GBP 936 million in total revenue last year, less than half came from airline charges, according to Duncan Bonfield, BAA’s director of corporate communications.

Heathrow also is making massive infrastructure investments, with roughly GBP 450 million budgeted for improvements linked to accommodating the Airbus A380, Mr. Bonfield said. The airport also is building a GBP 4.2 billion fifth terminal due to open in 2008. To fund these investments, Heathrow will raise its charges according to a formula cleared by the CAA — inflation plus 6.5% a year until 2008.

Charles de Gaulle is turning to Heathrow’s business model, where retail shops and airline charges both drive income. The Paris airport only started focusing on retail income three years ago, when Pierre Graff took over as Aeroports de Paris chairman, company officials say. Since 2003, income from retail shops like a Veuve Clicquot champagne boutique has climbed to 20% of the airport’s total revenue from 5%

Možda će ove godine nagrada ići poznatijim imenima i manje ezoteričnim nagradama. Reuters Thomson je, kao i svake godine, objavio svoja predviđanja za ovogodišnje nagrade na temelju ukupnih citata u svojoj ISI Web of Knowledge bazi podataka. Za 2008.

• Lars P. Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent and Christopher A. Sims  -  “for their contributions to dynamic econometric models.”
• Martin Feldstein  -  “for his research on public economics, including taxation, social security, health economics and many other topics.”
• Armen Alchian and Harold Demetz  -  “for their publications on property rights and their contributions to the theory of the firm.”

Hansen i Sargent bi zajedno mogli dobiti kao prirodan izbor dva ekonometričara, dok Sims i sam može odnjeti nagradu. Sims je pionir metoda vektorske autoregresije (VAR metode) u ekonometriji i raznih tehnika za detektiranje, vrlo bitno, uzročno posljedičnih veza. Vjerojatno bi najradije vidio Feldsteina kao pobjednika. Ne ove godine, ali svi ovi kandidati su vjerojatni Nobelovci u sljedećih par. Komisija koja dodjeljuje nagrade mora držati na umu i starost kandidata. To najviše u prilog ide posljednjoj dvojci. Alchian i Demetz su dva mikroekonomista rođena 1914. i 1930. Alchian je bivši profesor Nobelovcu iz 1990. William Sharpe.