Cronomy.org

NYT ima dobar video (kliknite na sliku za link) o usporedbi današnje financijske krize sa Velikom Depresijom, te da li su i koliko Vlade naučile lekcije 30tih (ako sam dobro shvatio kod nas VD se često naziva Velikom Krizom). Uz to, dva novinara komentiraju državnu intervenciju, što mogu učiniti, potrebi za novom regulacijom i koliko se ovo razlikuje od vladajuće politike (što uopće nije slobodno tržište kao što mnogi misle, već više sliči na politički kapitalizam).Za očekivati je da će doći do određenih promjena u ekonomskoj filozofiji prema financijsom sektoru.

Nakon video valjalo bi pročitati par linkova koji produbljuju diskusiju ove dvojce komentatora. Razgovora o tome još nema, no mnogi već brinu o dugoročnim posljedicama državnog ulaska u banke i njihovih politika kreditiranja. Iako se radi o vrlo limitiranom, zapravo pasivnim investiranjem američke države u banke kako bi ih rekapitalizirale (bez glasačkog prava ili mjesta u upravi)  uvaženi William Poole, dugogodišnji predsjednik St.Louis Fed, brine da će država pokušati usmjeriti kreditiranje banke u politički oportunom smjeru. Primjer Freddie i Fannie. To bi bila katastrofa.

Some banks need more capital not to expand lending, but to shore up the existing balance sheet. It would be a terrible mistake for Treasury to direct banks participating in its capital-infusion program to expand credit in particular directions, or in the aggregate. Exhibit A: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both now wards of the state. Do we need further exhibits? Federal credit allocation will be an unmitigated disaster.

Banks will not want to play this game. Treasury’s new program provides that a bank can exit by repurchasing Treasury shares with newly raised private capital. Given the program’s distasteful features and future dangers, banks may want to exit as soon as they can to escape potential federal intrusion into their lending practices. Only weak banks, after all, may remain in the program — a direct consequence of Treasury’s strong-arm tactics. Such an outcome would be unfortunate, as many banks do need more capital.

Some will dismiss my comments as reflecting exaggerated concerns. I well remember, though, how those advocating wage-price guideposts in the 1960s dismissed fears of full-blown wage-price controls. But when comprehensive controls became politically convenient for President Richard Nixon, he imposed them in 1971.

Edmund Phelps u članku koji sam reproducirao ovdje jučer kaže da bankarski sistem mora biti više okrenut poslovnom sektoru i njegovim šansama za razvoj, ne nekretninama i kratkoročnosti. Posve poželjno, no ukoliko poslovni sektor i poduzetništvo bude pod prevelikom državnom rukom, banke će se opet naći u situaciji kreditirati ogromnu potrošnju. (ne da ne bi trebale kreditirati potrošnju uopće) U velikoj mjeri to je upravo što se događa i u Hrvatskoj, i oni koji drže da bi državna banka riješila taj naš “problem” zagovaraju upravo ono što Poola gore zabrinjava.

Protiv političkog kapitalizma su i austrijanci (i.e. ekonomisti austrijanci za koje gajim određene, više nostalgične, simpatije). Ovo ljeto, prije svih nedavnih najvećih previranja i povijesnih bankorta, Jeff Frankels je na svom blogu napisao memorabilni post – “No atheists in foxholes, No libertarians in financial crises.” Bob McTeer, isto dugogodišnji predsjednik Dallas Feda je proširio raspravu na osobnu dilemu oko ekonomske filozofije. “You got to do what you got to do.” Citat iz Frankela ispod.

So what’s my point? Not to argue that governments should intervene always (nor that they should intervene never). The lesson for government officials is that wherever they choose to draw the bailout line – one hopes the line strikes an intelligent balance between the short-run advantages of ameliorating a serious financial crisis and the longer-run disadvantages of moral hazard — they should think through the system ahead of time. They should take the appropriate regulatory precautions during the boom times, which correspond to the bailouts that will inevitably come during the busts.

…It should not come as a surprise to high officials that there are such things as financial crises anymore than it should come as a surprise to soldiers that there are such things as bombs. Human nature must be accepted for what it is.   But in the case of  high officials, it shouldn’t be necessary for them to alter their fundamental beliefs when crisis strikes, in the absence of truly unforeseeable developments.